However, I do think many of us who have written such analyses — and I very much include myself here — have not been consistent about making an important distinction, and this has left us unnecessarily open to a reasonable criticism. For example, I have used the analogy of traffic lights to explain why it’s wrong to blame the crisis on irrational behavior. Suppose someone turned all the traffic lights green. The obvious result would be a whole bunch of accidents. Would we blame those accidents on the drivers? Would we say they were acting irrationally? No, in fact we’d probably say they were behaving quite rationally given the signals they faced. A green light doesn’t just mean “go”; it also implies the light the other way is red and that going is safe.

Changing the Incentives

One way to view the housing boom is as the outcome of government’s turning all the lights green, changing the incentives facing market actors and causing their rational responses to distorted signals to produce irrational outcomes. The Austrian story of boom and bust is really a story of the unsustainable boom. Central bank-generated inflation (in this case combined with policies to subsidize housing) led to artificially low interest rates and excessive investment in long-term projects that cannot be sustained by the amount of real saving taking place.

So what’s the problem? Some have interpreted this argument as letting the bankers off the hook too easily. This and similar arguments seem to suggest the bankers were innocent in that they just responded rationally to signals generated by the central bank or Congress. The problem is that, as several critics of mine have rightly pointed out, many of the housing policies were not imposed on the bankers but rather were aggressively lobbied for. In many cases (such as Countrywide), it was the bankers themselves who asked Congress for policies making it easier to lend to marginal customers and for Fannie and Freddie to have access to the Treasury. They also favored the implicit bailout promise, which sustained the mortgage-backed securities market. And many bankers cheered on the Fed’s low interest rates during the middle of last decade.

In addition to any ethically shady dealings banks might have had (and I do believe there are examples of this), we should not hesitate to blame them for the crisis for the reasons outlined: They were at least partially responsible for the passage of many of the government policies that created the boom and therefore the bust. To that extent, then, we can agree with our friends on the left that the bankers were part of the problem, which also suggests that protesting Wall Street is not wrong. None of this undermines the importance of my traffic lights analogy to make the point that rational responses to bad signals is a better way to understand the problem than irrational or “greedy” behavior. But that point needs to be supplemented by reminding people that it was often the bankers in cahoots with politicians who turned all the lights green in the first place!

Face the Facts

The upshot is that we have to acknowledge these issues. For too many people, the claim that “the bankers are responsible” is the same as “the free market is responsible.” We have to disentangle these two claims not by appearing to deny both of them, but by agreeing that the bankers are responsible — and showing that their responsibility consists in preventing the free market from working.

We — and I again include myself here — have to be careful to say that the lesson is not that bankers bear no responsibility, but that the free market bears no responsibility. We should make it clear to those we talk to that bankers are not exempt from Horwitz’s First Law of Political Economy: “No one hates capitalism more than capitalists.”

Regards,

Steven Horwitz

Banks, Not the Free Market, Are to Blame was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder. Visit Laissez Faire Books for the best selection of libertarian book titles.

Already large unions in the U.S are encouraging borrowers to challenge banks to prove they won your mortgage. They’ve set up a website asking the question, “Where’s your note?”

You can see where this is headed. No one in America wants to own a failure. The banks want to foreclose on homes and sell them and avoid taking losses. Borrowers (some of them, and some of them rightly) want to avoid paying a debt for an asset that’s worth less. No one wants to be responsible anymore because the most lucrative and least painful route is to abandon responsibility and your word.

This is a serious breakdown in one of the most basic elements of a functioning market: contract (doing what you said you’d do). People at every level appear to have cheated and lied during the housing boom. The borrowers who lied on their loan applications…the mortgage originators who made the loan without any documentation of work or income…the securitiser who packaged it up and sold it to investors…the ratings agency that rated the debt investment-grade…the insurance companies who sold default insurance against the bonds multiple times…and the government that encouraged home-ownership and subsidised the fraud with an implied guarantee on the bonds of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises that bought a lot of the garbage bonds.

What is really at stake though?

Well, if borrowers challenge foreclosure proceedings, and if banks (as they have already begun to do) halt foreclosure proceedings nationwide, the process of establishing a market-clearing price in the U.S. house market is frozen. Buyers can’t buy and sellers can’t sell if the ownership of the underlying collateral — the house itself — is in doubt. What sane person would enter a market like this with prices effectively having completely broken down?

As if that’s not bad enough — and it’s nearly as bad as it gets — don’t forget that that there is a whole universe of financial instruments whose value derives from the underlying collateral. Mortgage backed securities…collateralised debt obligations…the value of any instrument whose value is derived from the underlying asset is now suddenly in doubt.

It’s hard to understate what this could mean for financial markets. It could mean another capital crisis in the financial world. It would make 2008 look quaint.

This is why this problem is rapidly escalating into another contest between the banks and the borrowers. The U.S. Congress chose to side with the banks by passing a law (H.R. 3808) which would have made it easier for the banks to foreclose on properties without having to go through the usual process of documentation. But U.S. President Obama — less than a month away from an election that’s become a referendum on his policies — simply ignored the resolution (a pocket veto). Who wants to be seen siding with bankers right now?

Now you have a situation where U.S. banks again face massive losses on their exposure to residential real estate. You have a growing popular movement to challenge the banks through the legal system — raising bank costs and eating into bank earnings (which are already pretty flimsy when you take away the boost to the net interest margin from low short-term rates).

But the biggest problem by far is that you have a growing ethos in the American mortgage market that everything is so upside down and backwards that the best thing to do is just stop playing by the rules and stop paying your mortgage. The whole market is on the verge of breaking down. Trust has evaporated. The rule of law itself now seems irrelevant.

Who is the government going to side with in this dispute? The banks, who will claim (perhaps correctly) that the crisis threatens their ability to loan, and perhaps their very existence? Or will it choose an increasingly angry populace who doesn’t want to again get sacrificed on the altar of saving the financial system?

Our guess is the government won’t choose either. It will choose both!

The easiest way to deal with debt — if you have no intention of paying and don’t want to inflate it away right away — is to simply repudiate it. A great debt amnesty is required!

Bankers must be allowed to sell everything they don’t want to the government, and probably at a price that suits the bank, even if it wouldn’t be borne by the market. And distressed homeowners must be allowed to refinance at a fixed-rate for 50 years through a government lender that will never foreclose on them, and is probably statutorily prohibited from doing so. No one takes a loss. No one loses a house. Voila!

Of course it can’t work that way. Huge amounts of capital have been misallocated in a credit boom. The recovery begins when the losses are taken and household and corporate balance sheets are returned to sanity. But no one wants to deal with that pain. So insanity ensues and a completely zombified mortgage market looms.

Regards,
Dan Denning
The Daily Reckoning Australia
Whiskey & Gunpowder

October 13, 2010

The American Housing Market Is Headed for Total Destruction was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder. Visit Laissez Faire Books for the best selection of libertarian book titles.

The Daily Mail account put the blame for these disturbances on Germany’s finance minister, who warned the Greeks that “the German government does not intend to give a cent.” At least Bild, a popular German newspaper, was trying to be helpful. It suggested that Greece sell Corfu…and that Greeks get up earlier and work harder.

Meanwhile, from Iceland comes news that every voter with an IQ above air temperature has cast his ballot against a bailout plan. The Icelanders were slated to make good $5.3 billion in bank losses. But why shackle common voters to the banks’ losses? The plan was so outrageous and so unpopular that Iceland’s normally compliant Prime Minister called for a referendum. Given a chance to vote on it, 93% said no. The other 7% probably read it wrong.

Insurrection is in the air. In England, government employees are preparing the biggest strike since the ‘80s. In America, dissatisfaction with Congress is at record highs; four out of five of those polled say, “Nothing can be accomplished in Washington.”

Herewith, an attempt to deconstruct the rebel yell. By way of preview, it’s not the principle of the thing, we conclude; it’s the money.

There are more clowns in economics than in the circus. They invented an economic model that has been very popular for more than 50 years — particularly in the US and Britain. It began with a bogus insight; John Maynard Keynes thought consumer spending was the key to prosperity; he saw savings as a threat. He had it backwards. Consumer spending is made possible by savings, investment and hard work — not the other way around. Then, William Phillips thought he saw a cause and effect relationship between inflation and employment; increase prices and you increase employment too, he said.

Jacques Rueff had already explained that the Phillips Curve was just a flimflam. Inflation surreptitiously reduced wages. It was lower wages that made it easier to hire people, not enlightened central bank management. But the scam proved attractive. The economy has been biased towards inflation ever since.

Economists enjoyed the illusion of competence; they could hold their heads up at cocktail parties and pretend to know what they were talking about. Now they were movers and shakers, not just observers. The new theories seemed to give everyone what they most wanted. Politicians could spend even more money that didn’t belong to them. Consumers could enjoy a standard of living they couldn’t afford. And the financial industry could earn huge fees by selling debt to people who couldn’t pay it back.

Never before had so many people been so happily engaged in acts of reckless larceny and legerdemain. But as the system aged, its promises increased. Beginning in the ‘30s, the government took it upon itself to guarantee the essentials in life – retirement, employment, and to some extent, health care. These were expanded over the years to include minimum salary levels, unemployment compensation, disability payments, free drugs, food stamps and so forth. Households no longer needed to save.

As time wore on, more and more people lived at someone else’s expense. Lobbying and lawyering became lucrative professions. Bucket shops and banks neared respectability. Every imperfection was a call for legislation. Every traffic accident was an opportunity for wealth redistribution. And every trend was fully leveraged.

If there was anyone still solvent in America or Britain in the 21st century, it was not the fault of the banks. They invented subprime loans and securitizations to profit from segments of the market that had theretofore been spared. By 2005 even jobless people could get themselves into debt. Then, the bankers found ways to hide debt…and ways to allow the public sector to borrow more heavily. Goldman Sachs did for Greece essentially what it had done for the subprime borrowers in the private sector — it helped them to go broke.

As long as people thought they were getting something for nothing, this economic model enjoyed wide support. But now that they are getting nothing for something, the masses are unhappy. Half the US states are insolvent. Nearly all of them are preparing to increase taxes. In Europe too, taxes are going up. Services are going down. And taxpayers are being asked to pay for the banks’ losses…and pay interest on money spent years ago. Until now, they were borrowing money that would have to be repaid sometime in the future. But today is the tomorrow they didn’t worry about yesterday. So, the patsies are in revolt.

Several countries are already past the point of no return. Even if America taxed 100% of all household wealth, it would not be enough to put its balance sheet in the black. And Professors Rogoff and Reinhart show that when external debt passes 73% of GDP or 239% of exports, the result is default, hyperinflation, or both. IMF data show the US already too far gone on both scores, with external debt at 96% of GDP and 748% of exports.

The rioters can go home, in other words. The system will collapse on its own.

Regards,
Bill Bonner, The Daily Reckoning
for Whiskey & Gunpowder

March 15, 2010

Collapse Is Inevitable was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder. Visit Laissez Faire Books for the best selection of libertarian book titles.

My interest in Andy was due to the fact that he has been singularly successful in pretty much all aspects of the real estate market, including financing and developing large projects — such as shopping centers, apartment communities, office buildings, and warehouses — from one end of the country to the other. His expertise has also allowed him to build an impressive business providing assistance to large financial institutions that need help in dealing with problem commercial real estate loans. As you might suspect, business is booming.

Back in 2007, however, what most intrigued me about Andy was that he had been almost alone among his peer group in foreseeing the coming end of the real estate bubble, and in liquidating essentially all of his considerable portfolio of projects near the top. There are people that think they know what’s going on, and those who actually know — Andy very much belongs in the latter category.

In fact, he initially refused to speak at our event, only agreeing very reluctantly after I had hounded him for several months. The reason for his refusal, I later found out, was that he had spoken at several industry events before the real estate collapse and had been all but booed off the stage for his dire outlook.

The happy ending of this story is that Andy’s speech at our Summit was a rousing success, and he enjoyed it so much that he has now spoken at several, and has kindly agreed to sit for periodic interviews to keep our readers up to date on the latest developments in this critical sector. So far, Andy’s real estate forecasts continue to come true. 

As you’ll read in the following excerpt from my latest interview with Andy, who now spends considerable time each day helping the nation’s biggest banks cope with growing stacks of problem loans, he remains deeply concerned about the outlook for real estate.

David Galland

No one has been more right on the housing market in recent years. So, what’s coming next? Some of the housing numbers in the last few months look a little less ugly. Could housing be getting ready to get well?

MILLER: I don’t think so.

For all intents and purposes, the United States home mortgage market has been nationalized without anybody noticing. Last September, reportedly over 95% of all new loans for single-family homes in the U.S. were made with federal assistance, either through Fannie Mae and the implied guarantee, or Freddie Mac, or through the FHA.

If it’s true that most of the financing in the single-family home market is being facilitated by government guarantees, that should make everybody very, very concerned. If government support goes away, and it will go away, where will that leave the home market? It leaves you with a catastrophe, because private lenders for single-family homes are nervous. Lenders that are still lending are reverting to 75% to 80% loan to value. But that doesn’t help a homeowner whose property is worth less than the mortgage. So when the supply of government-facilitated loans dries up, it’s going to put the home market in a very, very bad place. 

Why am I so certain that the federal government will have to cut back on its lending? Because most of the financing is done via the bond market, through Ginnie Mae or other government agencies. And the numbers are so big that eventually the bond market is going to gag on the government-sponsored paper.

The public doesn’t have any idea of the scale of the guarantees the government is taking on through Fannie, Freddie, and FHA. It’s huge. If people understood what the federal government has done and subjected the taxpayers to, there would be a public outrage. But you can’t get people to focus on it, and it’s very esoteric, it’s very hard to understand. But it’s not something the bond market won’t notice. The government can’t keep doing what it has been doing to support mortgage lending without pushing interest rates way up.

Refinancings of single-family homes are very interest-rate sensitive. Consumers have their backs against the wall. They have too much debt. Refinancing their maturing mortgages or their adjustable-rate mortgages is very problematic if rates go up, but that’s exactly where they’re headed. So anyone who’s comforted by current statistics on single-family homes should look beyond the data and into the dynamics of the market. What they’ll find is very alarming.   

On that topic, recent data I saw was that something like 24% of the loans FHA backed in 2007 are now in default, and for those generated in 2008, 20% are in default, and the FHA is out of money.

MILLER: Fannie Mae had a $19 billion loss for the third quarter of 2009, and they are now drawing on their facility with the U.S. Treasury. We have all forgotten that Fannie and Freddie are still being operated under a federal conservatorship. On Christmas Eve, the agency announced that they were going to remove all the caps on the agencies.

So what about commercial real estate?

MILLER: When I saw what was happening in the housing market, I liquidated all my multifamily apartments, shopping centers, and office buildings. I liquidated all my loan portfolios, and I’m happy I did.

Then it occurred to me in 2005 and 2006 that the commercial world had to follow suit. Why? Because it’s a normal progression. Obviously, when single-family homes decline in value, multifamily apartments decline in value. And when consumers hit the wall with spending and debt, that’s going to have an impact on retailers that pay for commercial space.

Furthermore, the financing for retail properties had gotten ludicrous. The conduits were making loans that they advertised as 80% of property value when they originated them, but in reality the loan-to-value ratios were well over 100%. And I say that to you with absolute, categorical certainty, because I was a seller and nobody knew the value of the properties that I was selling better than I did. I had operated some of them for 20 years, so I knew exactly what they were bringing in. I knew what the operating expenses were, and I knew what the cap rates were. And, you know, the underwriting on the loan side and the purchasing side of these assets was completely insane. It was ludicrous. It did not reflect at all what the conduits thought they were doing. They were valuing the properties way too aggressively.

I became very bearish about the commercial business starting in late ‘05. In fact, I think I was in Argentina with Doug Casey, sitting on a veranda at one of the estancias, and he and I were lamenting what was going on in the real estate business, and I said there was going to be a huge adjustment in the commercial market.

Beyond the obvious, that the real estate market has taken pretty significant hits and some banks have been dragged under by their bad loans, what has really changed in real estate since the crash? 

MILLER: I think the first thing that changed was that people learned that prices don’t go up forever. Lenders also saw that underwriting guidelines for commercial real estate loans, especially in the securitization markets, were erroneous. They realized that some of their properties had been financed too aggressively, but still, I don’t think even at the fall of Lehman, anybody was predicting a wholesale collapse in commercial real estate.

But they did see they should be more circumspect with loan underwritings. In fact, after the fall of Lehman, they completely stopped lending. I think they realized we had been living in fantasy land for 10 years. And that was the first change — a mental adjustment from Alice in Wonderland to reality. 

Today it’s clear that commercial properties are not performing and that values have gone down, although I’ve got to tell you, the denial is still widespread, particularly in the United States and on the part of lenders sitting on and servicing all these real estate portfolios. People still do not understand how grave this is.

Right now there are an awful lot of banks that do an awful lot of commercial real estate lending, and for about a year now you’ve been telling me that you saw the first and second quarter of 2010 as being particularly risky for commercial real estate. Why this year, and what do you see happening with these loans and the banks holding them?

MILLER: It’s an educated guess, and it hasn’t changed. I still think that it’s second quarter 2010.

The current volume of defaults is already alarming. And the volume of commercial real estate defaults is growing every month. That can only keep going for so long, and then you hit a breaking point, which I believe will come sometime in 2010. When you hit that breaking point, unless there’s some alternative in place, it’s going to be a very hideous picture for the bond market and the banking system.

The reason I say second quarter 2010 is a guess is that the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC can influence how fast the crisis unfolds. I think they can have an impact on the severity of the crisis as well – not making it less severe but making it more severe. I will get to that in a minute. But they can influence the speed with which it all unfolds, and I’ll give you an example.

In November, the FDIC circulated new guidelines for bank regulators to streamline and standardize the way banks are examined. One standout feature is that as long as a bank has evaluated the borrower and the asset behind a loan, if they are convinced the borrower can repay the loan, even if they go into a workout with the borrower, the bank does not have to reserve for the loan. The bank doesn’t have to take any hit against its capital, so if the collateral all of a sudden sinks to 50% of the loan balance, the bank still does not have to take any sort of write-down. That obviously allows banks to just sit on weak assets instead of liquidating them or trying to raise more capital.

That’s very significant. It means the FDIC and the Treasury Department have decided that rather than see 1,000 or 2,000 banks go under and then create another RTC to sift through all the bad assets, they’ll let the banking system warehouse the bad assets. Their plan is to leave the assets in place, and then, when the market changes, let the banks deal with them. Now, that’s horribly destructive.

Just to be clear on this, let’s say I own an apartment building and I’ve been making my payments, but I’m having trouble and the value of the property has fallen by half. I go to the bank and say, “Look, I’ve got a problem,” and the bank says, “Okay, let’s work something out, and instead of you paying $10,000 a month, you pay us $5,000 a month and we’ll shake hands and smile.” Then, even though the property’s value has dropped, as long as we keep smiling and I’m still making payments, then the bank won’t have to reserve anything against the risk that I’ll give the building back and it will be worth a whole lot less than the mortgage.

MILLER: I think what you just described is accurate. And it’s exactly a Japanese-style solution. This is what Japan did in ‘89 and ‘90 because they didn’t want their banking system to implode, so they made it easier for their banks to sit on bad assets without owning up to the losses. 

And what’s the result? Well, it leaves the status quo in place. The real problem with this is twofold. One is that it prolongs the problem – if a bank is allowed to sit on bad assets for three to five years, it’s not going to sell them. 

Why is that bad? Well, the money tied up in the loans the bank is sitting on is idle. It is not being used for anything productive.

Wouldn’t banks know that ultimately the piper must be paid, and so they’d be trying to build cash — trying to build capital to deal with the problem when it comes home to roost?

MILLER: The more intelligent banks are doing exactly that, hoping they can weather the storm by building enough reserves, so when they do ultimately have to take the loss, it’s digestible. But in commercial real estate generally, the longer you delay realizing a loss, the more severe it’s going to be. I can tell you that because I’m out there servicing real estate all day long. Not facing the problems, and not writing down the values, and not allowing purchasers to come in and take these assets at discounted prices — all the foot-dragging allows the fundamental problem to get worse. 

In the apartment business, people are under water, particularly if they got their loan through a conduit. When maintenance is required, a borrower with a property worth less than the loan is very reluctant to reach into his pocket. If you have a $10 million loan on a property now worth $5 million, you’re clearly not making any cash flow. So what do you do when you need new roofs? Are you going to dig into your pocket and spend $600,000 on roofing? Not likely. Why would you do that?

Or a borrower who is sitting on a suburban office property — he’s got two years left on the loan. He knows he has a loan-to-value problem. Well, a new tenant wants to lease from him, but it would cost $30 a square foot to put the tenant in. Is the borrower going to put the tenant in? I don’t think so. So the problems get bigger.

Why would the owner bother going through a workout with the bank if he knows he’s so deep underwater he’s below snorkel depth?

MILLER: It’s always in your interest to delay an inevitable default. For example, the minute you give the property back to the bank, you trigger a huge taxable gain. All of a sudden the forgiveness of debt on your loan becomes taxable income to you. Another reason is that many of these loans are either full recourse or part recourse. If you’re a borrower who’s guaranteed a loan, why would you want to hasten the call on your guarantee? You want to delay as long as possible because there’s always a little hope that values will turn around. So there is no reason to hurry into a default. None.

So that’s from the borrower’s standpoint. But wouldn’t the banks want to clear these loans off their balance sheets? 

MILLER: No. The banks have a lot of incentive to delay the realization of the problem because if they liquidate the asset and the loss is realized, then they have to reserve the loss against their capital immediately. If they keep extending the loan under the rules present today, then they can delay a write-down and hope for better days. Remember, you suffer if the bank succumbs and turns around and liquidates that asset, then you really do have to take a write-down because then your capital is gone. 

So here we are, we’ve got the federal government again, through its agencies and the FDIC, ready to support the commercial real estate market. They’ve taken one step, in allowing banks to use a very loose standard for loss reserves. What else can they do?

MILLER: Well, obviously nobody knows, but I can guess at what’s coming by extrapolating from what the federal government has already done. I believe that the Treasury and the Federal Reserve now see that commercial real estate is a huge problem.

I think they’re going to contrive something to help assist commercial real estate so that it doesn’t hurt the banks that lent on commercial real estate. It’ll resemble what they did with housing.

They created a nearly perfect political formula in dealing with housing, and they are going to follow that formula. The entire U.S. residential mortgage market has in effect been nationalized, but there wasn’t any act of Congress, no screaming and shouting, no headlines in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times about “Should we nationalize the home loan market in America.” No. It happened right under our noses and with no hue and cry. That’s a template for what they could do with the commercial loan market. 

And how can they do that? By using federal guarantees much in the way they used federal guarantees for the FHA. FHA issues Ginnie Mae securities, which are sold to the public. Those proceeds are used to make the loans.

But it won’t really be a solution. In fact, it will make the problems much more intense. 

Don’t these properties have to be allowed to go to their intrinsic value before the market can start working again?

MILLER: Yes. Of course, very few people agree with that, because if you let it all go today, there would be enormous losses and a tremendous amount of pain. We’re going to have some really terrible, terrible years ahead of us because letting it all go is the only way to be done with the problem. 

Do you think the U.S. will come out of this crisis? I mean, do you think the country, the institutions, the government, or the banking sector are going to look anything like they do today when this thing is over?

MILLER: I know this is going to make you laugh, but I’m actually an optimist about this. I’m not optimistic about the short run, and I’m not optimistic about the severity of the problem, but I’m totally optimistic as it relates to the United States of America.

This is a very resilient place. We have very resilient people. There is nothing like the American spirit. There is nothing like American ingenuity anywhere on Planet Earth, and while I certainly believe that we are headed for a catastrophe and a crisis, I also believe that ultimately we are going to come out better.

Regards,
David Galland
The Casey Report
 
Andy Miller is the co-founder of the Miller Frishman Group (MillerFrishman.com), which includes three companies serving different sectors of the real estate market – from mortgage brokerage and banking, to the building, management, and marketing of commercial real estate across the United States. His firm is currently deeply involved in the distressed real estate business, assisting lenders across the nation with their growing portfolios of non-performing loans.

February 10, 2010

An Insider’s View of the Real Estate Train Wreck was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder. Visit Laissez Faire Books for the best selection of libertarian book titles.

– Hazel Bedingfield, 79, who now travels 24 miles for her Social Security payment at her new bank

You deposit your paycheck on Friday and can’t get money out on Saturday.

But don’t worry, the FDIC will cut you a check on Monday morning.

Your county commissioner tells the evening news: “The bank failure opens up an opportunity for another bank to set up here. Until then, customers will have to find another bank in a surrounding county.”

Your bank might have been built in 1905. It may have survived two world wars and a Great Depression. It was sold in 2000 and rebranded when the new owners moved headquarters to Atlanta…you can guess the rest.

This happened to citizens in Gibson, Georgia. And it could happen to you tomorrow.

The Feds raid your bank on Friday…They escort the CEO out. Then they empty the vault.

Right now, aren’t you wondering how much longer will this go on? The short answer: about $13 billion worth of FDIC intervention. I’m wondering if that’ll be enough.

Gargantuan, unfounded suburban growth ringing ’round the Peach State’s metropolis Hotlanta takes the brunt of the blame for bank collapses left and right. Especially those construction loans. A typical example of why these failed, according to FDIC investigation: Over 75% of the loan money was handed out before a single day of on-site construction began.

But here’s a big reason: Banks invest in other banks. Some banks never see nice depositors walk up to their ATMs or get lollipops at the counter. The wholesale bank’s only clients are other banks. If some of those big-ticket clients fold, well, there goes the bank. Silverton was just such a bank, with about 1,500 client banks in 44 of the 50 states. This earned Silverton the nickname “the Mini-Federal Reserve.”

The trouble came from the chunks of real estate loans Silverton sold to other banks in “low-growth” areas: deposit-rich regions that are “loan poor.” Guess that means places that aren’t Nevada, California or Georgia. It didn’t stop Florida Community Bank from adding a stake in the now-defunct Silverton bank to its $978 million dollar asset base. And the FCB ranks among the weakest financial institutions in Florida. We are not surprised.

Even Atlanta’s Federal Home Loan Bank, as 2009 dawned, was straddling the mere 3% capital ratio that would set a regulator’s teeth on edge. (The culprit there was the unwinding private-label mortgage-backed securities.)

Now get this. The Georgia banks facing FDIC conservatorship often depend on loan advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta to stay afloat, and the FHLB gets paid first, before depositors — costing the FDIC even more millions — even if the collateral isn’t there to do it.

Georgia regulators OK’d any fly-by-night bank startup. After all, who didn’t want a cut from making loans to real estate developers? At the start of the housing collapse, Georgia had 334 banks. That’s more than in California, which has four times Georgia’s population. Dan Amoss, the editor of Strategic Short Report, points a finger at this failed bank and offers some advice:

“A perfect example is Integrity Bank in Georgia, which should have been shut down long before it was allowed to attract new deposits with high CD rates.

“Also, note to Whiskey readers: If your CD rates seem too good to be true, your bank may not be healthy, and you may have to deal with the hassle of not accessing your money while the bank is resolved.”

All last week, Dan and I fired e-mails back and forth about the next U.S. bank to fail: The Great Southern behemoth: Colonial BancGroup. Then, on Friday Aug. 14, it finally happened…

BB&T to Swallow Colonial Whole: What Bones Will It Spit Out?

Colonial tapped the FDIC’s matchmaking skills to shack up with BB&T. Expect this marriage to look like the 20-something who marries the wealthy old man because she can’t wait to max out his credit cards. Dan bet me last Friday that dilutive stock offerings were on the way.

Sure enough, come Monday, BB&T offered 26.6 million brand-new shares to some willing dupes.

Like the other Southern banks we’ve been talking about, Alabama-based Colonial’s arms stretched into bad places like Georgia and Florida. And here’s what helped shake Colonial’s foundation. They call it warehouse lending. That’s short-term financing that independent mortgage bankers relied on to do business. Fannie, Freddie or Ginnie did not guarantee these loans.

Back in the 2007’s warehouse-lending heyday, the market was a $200 billion business. Lately, of course, the rich well dried up, to just $25 billion in lending. Colonial held the big 25% chunk of it. So now that it has dropped out of the race, who’s left?

The other warehouse-lending trendsetters already lie in the grave. The biggest tombstones: Countrywide and WaMu. And there’s a fresh hole dug for a new occupant: Guaranty Bank of Texas, which issued the FDIC red alert last month. Finally, we have National City (acquired by PNC).

What does this tell us? If all the big enablers for these loans are shutting up shop under duress, it makes you think there could be something wrong with the product. Instead of letting the free market eat the gross error of overexuberance, the industry is lobbying Washington to give government-backed Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae a bigger role in warehouse lending.

Don’t Let the GSEs Take Over

Let’s flash back to a nice piece of advice that still holds true for Fannie, Freddie and fast-growing Ginnie. Back in March 2002, the prescient Chris Mayer (before he joined the Agora family) wrote a missive for Mises.org called “Mortgage Market Socialization.” Take a look at this bit of prophecy:

Forgotten is the truism that periods of prosperity necessarily precede periods of crisis. Thus, caution becomes heresy and optimism becomes the new religion.

The only way to correct this problem is the same way all socialistic practices are corrected — the government’s involvement must be severed completely. Just because the GSEs have led a charmed life so far is no reason to infer that their future will always be so bright. Socialism is not dead; it is alive in institutions like the GSEs.

The longer the GSEs are able to expand as they have, the more certain it becomes that someday taxpayers will have to bear the cost of such excess. Like Russian roulette, the longer you play, the more certain it becomes that you will bear the risk for playing.

I don’t know about Congress, but I think you Shooters would be eager to put down this particular gun. We’ve already paid about $86 billion in bailouts and what’s it gotten us? But since Fannie and Freddie backs or owns more than half of the single-family mortgages — probably yours — how about we just don’t load any more bullets?

Here’s the directionless drivel from Tim Geithner, recently before the Senate Banking Committee, as reported by Bloomberg:

“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will remain in limbo, as the U.S. Treasury secretary said the government doesn’t have time now to deal with the future of the two mortgage-finance companies it seized in September.

“We did not believe that we could at this time — in this time frame — lay out a sensible set of reforms to guide, to determine what their future role should be. We’re going to begin a process of looking at broader options for what their future should be…

“We just didn’t think it’s an essential thing to do just now, but it is an essential thing to do.”

Doesn’t this fill you with confidence? You see, Shooters, this whole mess began at an exclusive resort island off the coast of Georgia…The ol’ Jekyll Island Club set the foundation for sopping up and propping up incompetence in 1913.

Regards,
Samantha Buker

August 21, 2009

Who Killed 21 Georgia Banks? was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder. Visit Laissez Faire Books for the best selection of libertarian book titles.

Right now, the market has priced bank stocks for perfection, but the earnings outlook remains bleak. Investors are excited about the wide yield curve that’s enabling banks to borrow at ultra low rates and lend at much higher rates. But starting a few years ago — and going forward a few more years — losses on loans made during the bubble will matter more than the wide yield curve. More bank failures, capital shortfalls, dividend cuts and shareholder dilution are in the cards for most bank stock fans.

Because bank stocks usually act as a canary in the coal mine, a continued bear market in banks translates into a continued bear market in most other stocks. The evidence tells me we’re experiencing a bear market rally, not a new bull market. The promoters of the idea that this is a new bull market are ignoring one of the worst enemies of stocks: uncertainty. Right now, especially considering aggressive government policies, uncertainty about the future business environment is very high.

As regular readers of Whiskey & Gunpowder know, the government’s land grab is going to make things worse. It seems that there’s no end to the threats facing corporate profits, which will make corporate loans that much harder to pay back. This is not a garden-variety recession. It’s more like a depression, so the so-called economists parroting the “recession is over” message will have a rude awakening soon enough.

Let’s briefly consider the sentiment toward overall market. Aside from the investor sentiment polls, you can tell how bullish investors are by the multiples they are willing to pay for stocks. And right now, after the sharpest 5-month rally since the 1930s, the market is trading at valuations that require a strong economic recovery, and a return to credit bubble conditions. The rally was powered entirely by P/E multiple expansion, not earnings growth. That sort of rally would be justifiable if corporate revenues and earnings were about to soar, but they’re not. Most earnings surprises were due to cost cutting, rather than top-line growth, which is like burning your furniture to stay warm.

The market is not even that cheap when you consider how artificially inflated earnings were at the 2007 peak. Financial earnings made up 18% of the S&P 500’s earnings in 2007 — much more if you add the “earnings” from the finance divisions of industrial conglomerates like GE and GM. Any claims that the S&P 500 is cheap because 2007 somehow represents “normalized earnings power” are bogus. The corporate profit margins and earnings won’t return to that level for many years.

The talking heads are getting more creative in their rationale for owning stocks right now. Most money managers seem to be thinking: “I don’t believe in this rally, but I’ll ride it until it looks like it’s over, and then I’ll sell.” This is the type of dangerous crowd psychology that consumes most people during bubbles. When enough investors share this Ponzi sentiment, and nobody’s investing on the basis of sober, rational fundamental analysis, the result is sometimes a crash.

Bank Accounting: Educated Guesses about the Future

This brings us to the poor quality of earnings, particularly at commercial banks. Accounting — especially the accounting that produces income statements at banks — is more art than science. It’s as much opinion as it is fact. Bank executives have a lot of leeway in how and when they recognize credit losses. As you’d imagine, some of them have more creative imaginations than others. Some are actively engaging in “extend and pretend,” a practice in which banks refinance deadbeat borrowers to avoid reporting loan losses.

Banks make loans expecting to receive interest and principal payments in a timely fashion. Banks book revenues, expected credit and operating costs, and profits associated with every loan upfront. But as we’ve discovered, the credit costs, or losses, often wind up being much larger than originally expected. When this happens, banks must dramatically ramp up their “loan loss provision” expense, which cuts into earnings, often pushing earnings into the red.

So the ultimate credit costs associated with bank revenues often take a year or more to be reflected in earnings and capital cushions. That’s why regulators require banks to maintain an “allowance for loan losses.” This allowance is a contra account on the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet, and its purpose is to absorb credit losses from loans as they run through the default and recovery phases. Loan losses, net of recoveries, deplete the allowance. Banks can rebuild their loan loss allowance by booking larger provision expenses, but this process cuts directly into earnings.

The chart below shows how under-reserved banks are right now, so they still have a ways to go in accounting for the losses on loans made during the bubble. These numbers are the combined figures for over 7,000 U.S. commercial banks insured by the FDIC. In blue, you see the combined loan loss allowance climbed to $156 billion by the end of 2008. In red, you see that noncurrent loans — the raw material for credit losses — had soared even faster to $200 billion by the end of 2008, and are still climbing sharply. As a rule of thumb, to remain well capitalized, and to prevent their allowance from shrinking to dangerously low levels, banks should book provision expenses in line with the increase in noncurrent loans.

But since the credit crisis began, this has not been happening. As the green line shows, the ratio of loss allowance to noncurrent loans for the entire banking system has fallen below 100%. To rebuild the industry wide loss allowance back up to an adequate level, provision expenses will have to rise faster than delinquencies. Some banks can only catch up by raising new capital from investors. Those banks that are too far behind, and cannot raise capital, will be taken over by the FDIC. All of this translates into a strong headwind for bank earnings over the next few years.

Recall that bank executives have lots of control over the timing of loss recognition. Evidence that banks are delaying loss recognition is springing up all over the place. For instance, some banks that provided unsecured revolving lines of credit to highly indebted REITs have waived some restrictive loan covenants. In residential mortgages, we’ve seen lots of instances where banks are stringing along underwater homeowners with modifications that do little more than kick the can down the road.

It would make more sense to restructure mortgages on underwater properties where the bank receives a property appreciation right in exchange for a large reduction in mortgage principle. This makes more sense from a societal perspective, and would help accelerate the return to a healthier, less “zombified” banking system. But this idea is not popular among bankers, because doing so would force the bank to immediately recognize lots of losses, which could cut heavily into the bank’s capital.

This state of bank accounting is not limited to the U.S. In fact, in some instances, the accounting at some foreign banks is even more detached from reality than it is in the U.S. For readers of Strategic Short Report, I recently uncovered a non-U.S. bank that’s been especially tardy in disclosing its credit losses. It’s a very attractive short sale right now, especially because the market loves this bank, and is totally ignoring the wave of credit losses to come in the near future.

Regards,
Dan Amoss

August 13, 2009

Bank Accounting Fudges Loan Losses was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder. Visit Laissez Faire Books for the best selection of libertarian book titles.

In a recent editorial, Peter Schiff reminded me of what my late friend Harry Browne, the former Libertarian Party candidate for president, used to say: “The government is great at breaking your leg, handing you a crutch, and then saying, ‘You see, without me, you couldn’t walk.’” That maxim is clearly illustrated by the financial industry regulatory reforms proposed recently by the Obama administration. (“Would you like a broken arm, or would you prefer a broken leg?”)

Every economic problem we face can be directly traced back to the federal government and the interfering laws that it continually passes. Remember the Resolution Trust Corp. back in the 1980s? It became “necessary” to bail out the savings and loan industry because so many of the S&Ls gambled wildly with their depositors’ money. Sound familiar? How could the S&Ls of the 1980s and the too-big-to-fail banks of the ’00s make such horrible business decisions? Were/Are the management teams just stupid or are they also incompetent?

Consider this: We’ve had a record number of bank failures just this year. As of June 19, 2009, the FDIC has closed 40 banks at a net cost of over $11.5 billion. Are you worried? Why not? Oh, your account is insured. By whom? So when the management of the bank that controls your deposits makes stupid business decisions, you don’t care? The FDIC will bail out your account. Not only that, the “insured” amount was increased from a “mere” $100,000 per account to $250,000 this year (this extra coverage expires at the end of 2013 and reverts back to the $100,000 figure in 2014 as currently scheduled). Do you see a slight problem here?

Just for giggles, suppose there were no FDIC and your deposits at any bank or S&L were simply not insured. Would you then perhaps have a slightly different outlook as to the safety of your money? Would you perhaps behave somewhat differently when selecting a bank in which to deposit your funds? Why? Do you now see that the FDIC is a federal government-sponsored insurance scheme to protect you from greedy and stupid bankers? Or do you perhaps see that the FDIC actually facilitates excessive risk-taking on the part of the bankers, since they have nothing to loose? Do you suppose there might be a slight moral hazard hiding somewhere in this mix? If the bank did not have the FDIC insuring your deposit and that same bank had to compete in the open, free market for your deposit account, would you suppose that the bank management might behave in a slightly more conservative manner? Wouldn’t you behave in a slightly more conservative manner when selecting a bank?

Now consider the actions of the too-big-to-fail companies, be they banks, insurance companies, Freddie and Fannie, or even automobile manufacturing companies. What’s to restrain the management of those companies? If they mess up, the government will protect them. And as we’ve all observed, the very folks that made the stupid and reckless business decisions will still get their multimillion-dollar bonuses. Would you be willing to make a wild guess that maybe there is a slight moral hazard hiding somewhere in this scheme?

What about the business management that continues to make prudent decisions and continues to operate profitably? What is their incentive? How are they rewarded? The same federal government that bails out the too-big-to-fail companies totally ignores the hardworking, successful managements of the smaller businesses. Actually, it’s even worse than that. The companies and individuals that are successful now get penalized, because their tax dollars are used to bail out the unsuccessful. They get to subsidize the failures. Isn’t that a wonderful reward for doing a good job?

So I again ask what am I missing? Am I the only person (or only one of the very few) concerned? When I/we comment about these obvious inequities, does anyone pay attention? Does anyone question the wisdom of the federal government’s decisions? Based on the feedback I’ve received from the congressmen and -women who claim to “represent” me, they certainly don’t care. Aside from the folks who attended the various Tea Parties on April 15, the rest of the folks don’t seem to care. What am I missing?

One of the factors that caused me to write this white paper is the incredible discussion of so-called “green shoots” from our eminent Fed head “Helicopter” Ben Bernanke and the observation of the recovery light at the end of the tunnel that now seem to be so visible to the mainstream media. As Ronald Reagan used to say, the media know a great deal that just isn’t true.

There has been a tremendous recent effort to create “transparency” in and from government. Using that as a diversionary tactic, the public’s attention is now away from the facts. While perception is important and can mask facts for a period of time, it cannot avoid ultimate economic laws of nature. In this case, the public’s attention is being diverted from the undeniable facts that we are nowhere near the bottom of this economic downturn. Banks are still hiding toxic waste in their off-balance sheet accounts. These virtually worthless assets are not just going to disappear with no one noticing. Sooner or later, these near-worthless assets must be accounted for. The so-called bank stress tests were a joke. The intent was just to give the public the perception that the worst is over.

It isn’t. We have at least one more major leg-down in our economic future. And I believe that leg will take us to a Dow of 5,000 and perhaps as low as 3,000. Yes, the Dow may continue upward to 10,000 from its current level of 8,500, but then it will head down once again. All we have to do is look at Japan 1989-present and our own economy from 1929-1932. Oh, yes, it can happen again! Absolutely nothing has been done to prevent a repeat of this history. In fact, what has already been done by the federal government interference with our markets almost assuredly guarantees that it will happen once again.

What is it that will happen? A depression. Why? Because too many government interferences have occurred over the decades since the last depression. Perhaps it might be helpful to first define the difference between a recession and a depression — at least by my definitions of the terms.

Business cycles frequently become what are referred to as overheated economic cycles. (Note that every one of these so-called overheated situations is a direct result of government monetary interference with what otherwise would be free market behavior.) So a so-called cooling-off period of adjustment then takes place to correct the malinvestments that were made during these periods of irrational exuberance (thanks, Alan). These adjustments happen rather quickly, and then the recession is finished. You’ve heard it called the “V” recession because we tend to enter quickly but then we tend to also recover quickly. Today, the mainstream is talking of a “W” recovery, meaning a double in-and-out recession. But recessions usually take place rather quickly and are then finished. In a depression, structural changes to the economy actually occur and then it takes years to readjust. Can you say Japan? The new version of the resulting economy is a major change from the prior economy. Old bubbles are never reinflated, but new bubbles are ultimately formed. Note that our federal government is trying to reinflate the last bubble, meaning a return to a consumer-led economy. It simply won’t happen. We’ll waste a tremendous amount of taxpayer money and it will all be for naught.

Ultimately, a new bubble will be created. In the past decade, we’ve enjoyed the Greenspan dot-com bubble followed by the real estate bubble. Now we are starting to form what I see as a bond bubble. In the process, everything in the path of this “recovery” is being socialized: banks, insurance companies, mortgage lenders, even automobile companies. Yet to come will probably include national health care. If you think private health care is expensive, wait until you see how much “free” health care costs. But this is what I mean by “structural” changes. It’s new territory for most of the participants.

What do you think will be the end result: inflation or deflation? I think we’re in for both deflation and inflation — in that order. Short-term deflation, but longer-term inflation. So I’d invest to protect myself against inflation. That means precious metals, energy, and commodities such as foods and water. Period. For the foreseeable future. Speculations would be in the area of biotech, nanotech, and stem-cell-tech.

I also hope that my comments are just being realistic — not doom and gloom. I admit my emotional reactions may be affecting my opinions. I hope not. But I’d rather be overprepared than underprepared or unprepared.

Considering that the value of our dollar is being actively destroyed by our government, how will you protect yourself and your family from further destruction of the dollar? Are you aware that the dollar is now worth 4% of what it was worth when the Federal Reserve was created with the charter mandate to provide a stable dollar? What did I just say? Are you happy with 4 cents of purchasing power left for your hard-earned 100-cent dollar? Don’t take my word for it — it’s on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Web site. My recommendation includes making investments in areas that are not dollar denominated. As such, you can expect to benefit from a currency hedge as well as from the performance of the investment itself. Today, all currencies are fiat, so this becomes a relatively moot consideration — see my next comment below.

Still another area to consider is foreign exchange. Consider Swiss francs and Chinese renminbi (yuan) for starters. Also consider the Brazilian real, due to the country’s incredible discovery of offshore oil. The real would be a speculation, while the franc and yuan are slam-dunks. Norway’s kroner is also a consideration, due to the country’s oil economy. I’d stay away from the Canadian loonie simply because Canada’s economy is so closely tied to the US’.

I believe we are in a depression, not just a recession. By that, I mean we’re in for major structural changes, not just a clearing of some malinvestments that got out of hand in recent years. The Dow could go as high as 10,000 before the next drop, but there will be another drop. As I said, I expect the Dow to go as low at 5,000 and possibly 3,000. I know how that sounds, but that is what the markets are telling me. While we will then recover, it will be a long, drawn-out recovery. Years, not months. This is not the muddle-through recession that so many expect. I’m guessing we’ll remain in this morass for at least five years, if we’re lucky. We could go the way of Japan, which hasn’t recovered yet after two decades! The more Washington interferes with the markets, the more severe the problems then become and the longer the recovery period. As Bill Bonner is fond of saying, we’ll see “a corrective force equal and opposite to the deception and delusion that preceded it.” And of course, we could just be headed into outright and total socialism, so all this attempted planning could just be for naught.

But back to my original question: What am I missing? What do you know that I seem to be overlooking? Why am I not in agreement with all the mainstream economists and government officials such as “Helicopter” Ben Bernanke and Timothy tax cheat-in-charge-of-the-IRS Geithner? Why is it OK for the U.S. government to “fire” all the profitable Chrysler dealerships because they donated to the Republicans while keeping the unprofitable Chrysler dealerships because they supported the Democrats? Why is it OK to medically insure the 47 million uninsured at the expense of the folks that actually pay the premiums? Why is it OK to bail out AIG because it insured Goldman Sachs? Why is it OK to “gift” a major ownership of General Motors to the UAW simply because the union supported the Obama election campaign? Why is it OK to stiff the Chrysler and GM bondholders who, by USA contract law, have first right to the assets of the corporations in case of a bankruptcy? Why is it OK to simply ignore and override centuries-old corporate law? Why is it OK to issue presidential edicts that circumvent corporate and civil law? Why? What am I missing? Why?

There is much, much more to be said on this topic. However, what I’ve already written is probably more than enough for the moment. By the way, were I a registered broker or financial adviser, the securities rules and regulations would prohibit me from telling you the above. So don’t be too hard on your current financial adviser. The government would suspend his/her license for telling you the truth.

Regards,
Tex Norton

July 10, 2009

FDIC Fosters Moral Hazard Among Banks was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder. Visit Laissez Faire Books for the best selection of libertarian book titles.

The present “value” of a future receivable is the subject of speculation. Laws that constrain how much banks may lend should not presuppose any relation between the two. The debate of “mark to market” accounting versus “mark to model” accounting, each of which makes such a presupposition, misses this point.

Take, as an example, a simple toy model: Two mortgage banks each lend $300,000 to two home buyers, in return for $700,000, $300 K principal and $400 K interest, in monthly payments over the next 30 years. They can each make $400 K profit over that rather long time scale. How much is the right to collect the $400 K in the future worth at the present time? Who knows? Banking laws should not be formulated in such a way that their enforcement requires knowing it.

Now suppose each bank sells the other an identical “security” backed by the mortgages (MBS), for $500 K, soon after the loans are made. The exchange of identical securities is obviously an empty exercise in terms of meaningful wealth, yet, on paper, each bank has lent out $300K and received $500K shortly thereafter. Sounds like a $200K profit, right? True, they spent $500K buying each other’s MBS, but in return they each got an MBS worth (for the time being) $500K, so they broke even on that; you can hardly consider it a loss. Where, then, did the $200K profit come from? It came from the future, and was declared a profit in the present. With that profit, the banks can immediately bloat their operating costs by paying its employees bonuses, larger salaries, and hiring more employees.

Now the paper trail in the mortgage industry is of course far more complicated than the toy model, but I bet that underneath all the complicated mortgage derivative paper, the same principle was at work: anticipated future wealth was cashed in and distributed in the present. For example, the obligation in a credit default swap or insurance policy on a mortgage may be activated as soon as the default is declared, even though the default was on a future debt repayment. Creditors that collect their insurance on a defaulted debt enjoy a payment in the present on a debt that would have been collected in the future.

Debating how much anticipated future revenues are worth at present does not change a basic fact of life: A promise is worth less than what is promised. The risks that the promise might not be kept are a form of negative `wealth. Mortgage-backed securities simultaneously create mutually canceling positive wealth (short term profits) and negative wealth (future risk) out of thin air, the way positive and negative charge are created by a spark. In this manner, they allow present wealth to flow, like electric current through a short circuit, from the depositors to the bank administration. In the above example, the promise of $400 K in future interest payments is worth only $200 K at present. The risk that it might not be paid, which is worth minus $200 K, is the “hole” left by the profit grabbed by the bank. There is only one acceptable limit to the amount of negative wealth that mortgage banks should be allowed slip to its depositors without their consent: zero. (Would you debate how many short circuits should be acceptable in a car battery?)

The banking laws should therefore insulate the future from the present to the full extent possible. A proper evaluation of a bank’s solvency should respect the dimension of time; it should both keep track of the bank’s books and regulate their activities accordingly on a year-by-year basis well into the future. The amount of interest they promise to pay out in 2015 should be tied to the amount they expect to collect in 2015. The maximum amount of debt to which they are liable at present should be tied to their present reserves, not to anticipated future revenues. Confusing future receivables with present assets is asking for trouble, no matter by what mathematical modeling procedure you compare the two.

Uncertainty in how much anticipated future interest payments are worth at present should remain the risk of speculators, not depositors. The depositors, whose money was loaned to the home buyers, are already assuming a fair share of the risk merely by parting with cash in exchange for the collateral, whose value may yet go down, and granting occupancy to the home buyer. Anyone’s rights to a share in the future interest payments should be predicated on their waiting patiently for them.

Physicists used to think that a particle had a particular energy at any instant, but finally, in formulating quantum mechanics nearly a century ago, they realized that it doesn’t. The shorter the time interval over which you try to guess the energy of a particle, the greater the uncertainty in your guess. Only after physicists humbly (and therefore with great difficulty) accepted this uncertainty did they proceed to the dramatic advances of the 20th century in understanding the microscopic structure of matter. Maybe it is time for economists and accountants, now puzzling over the microscopic details of failed financial instruments, to make a similar transformation, and accept the fact that future receivables simply don’t have a well-definable present value.

Short term gain and long term consequences go together like love and marriage. The current difficulties of lending institutions is what we folks get from their recent whoopie. The future has just arrived, and there is plenty more of it.

Regards,
David Eichler

June 16, 2009

The Uncertainty Principle in Accounting was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder. Visit Laissez Faire Books for the best selection of libertarian book titles.

This fantasy rests on some assumptions that just don’t “pencil out.” One is that the broad American car-owning public can continue to buy their cars the usual way, on credit. The biggest emerging new class in America is the “former middle class.” Credit kept the remnants of the middle class going for decades after their incomes stopped growing in the 1970s. Now, their incomes have stopped coming in altogether and they are sinking into swamp of entropy already occupied by the tattoo-for-lunch-bunch. Of course, this has plenty of dire sociopolitical implications.

Unfortunately, the big American banks did their biggest volume business in their biggest loans at the very time that that the middle class was on its way to becoming former. Now that the former middle class is arriving at its destination, the banks are so damaged by bad paper that they won’t make loans to even the remnant of the remnant of the middle class. In other words, the entire model for financing Happy Motoring is now out-of-order, probably permanently.

Even assuming some Americans can continue buying cars one way or another, I’m not convinced that we can make the kinds we fantasize about. Notice, nobody talks about hydrogen-powered fuel cell cars anymore. Why not? Because the technicalities and logistics could not be overcome at the scale required — i.e. at the current scale of mass highway motoring and commuting. Sure, you could build a demonstration vehicle and run it around a test track a few times, but could you build a mass production car by the tens of millions that would run for 150,000 miles without a hugely expensive fuel cell change-out? No, at least not within the time-window that the liquid hydrocarbon fuel problem presented. Or could you construct a hydrogen fuel station (and product delivery) network replacing the old gasoline stations? Fuggeddabowdit. Hydrogen, as an element, was just too hard to move and contain. It’s teeny-weeny atoms leaked out of valves and gaskets remorselessly and you couldn’t pack enough into a tanker truck to make the trip to its destination worthwhile. Schemes to generate hydrogen on-board all ended up in the “perpetual motion” sink.

The current wish is that the dregs of GM and Chrysler will hire low-paid elves with no pension or health benefits and pump out hybrid and/or electric cars. It’s conceivable that we could “reverse-engineer” a Prius or an Insight, but considering what a lousy job American car companies did on reverse-engineering everything that Japan or Germany pumped out over the past thirty-five years, the odds are pretty high that these new products will be just lame enough to fail against the established competition. What’s more, they also present logistical and technical problems. For the hybrid, gasoline is still an issue (and Jevon’s Paradox comes into play: the more efficient you make a means for using a resource, the more of that resource you will use). For both the hybrid and the electric car, the issue of how to get enough lithium for the batteries obtains, at least for now, given the current state-of-the-art battery technology. Most of this rare metal now comes from one place, Bolivia, and everybody wants “a piece” of it. Electric vehicles in large numbers depend on either coal or nuclear powered electric generation, each presenting special hazards. Both hybrids and electric cars would depend on the old installment loan purchase system — at least to work in the current mode of suburban living, long-range commuting, and interstate highway travel.

Boone Pickens’s plan of last year for converting the US car fleet to natural gas was another fantasy with wide appeal. But it depended on the companion fantasy of building massive wind-farm infrastructure on the great plains to shift natural gas use from power plants to vehicles, and the financial crisis has destroyed the capital necessary to even begin planning that project — it even destroyed a large part of Mr. Pickens own capital reserves. Anyway, I would not be so sanguine about the long-term future of the shale gas plays that this scheme was based on. The depletion rates of these wells is horrendous and the amount of steel needed to keep production up is not consistent with the realities of the available infrastructure.

All the technologies under consideration are not likely to extend the Happy Motoring era. A prayerful reflection on them can only reinforce the specialness of oil and its byproducts — cheap oil double-specially — as well as reinforcing the reality that the cheap energy era itself is over. And, of course, in the play of events over the past several years we can see the relationship between cheap energy and easy credit, and how our entire economy has run aground, one way or another, on resource limits.

The implications of all this in the sociopolitical and geopolitical realms are pretty daunting. As long as we maintain Happy Motoring as the normal mode of existence in this country, we are going to see an ever-growing class of very resentful citizens pissed off at being foreclosed from it. In my oft-repeated scheme-of-things, this leads very quickly to the trap of political extremism, perhaps even corn-pone Naziism, as the system becomes increasingly difficult to prop up except by force. In geopolitical terms it leads to ever more dangerous international contests over the world’s remaining oil reserves.

All this leads to two conclusions.

One is to accept the fact that the Happy Motoring era is over and to devote our remaining resources to re-localization, walkable communities, and public transit. It obviously requires a very drastic revision of our current collective self-image, of what we aspire to and who we are. If the car companies have any future at all, it should be based on making the rolling stock for public transit — and for now the most intelligent choice for us is to fix the existing passenger railroad lines instead of venturing into grandiose new transit systems requiring stupendous capital outlays. Let the car era wind down gracefully. Triage and prioritize the highway maintenance agenda — we won’t be affluent enough to keep repaving the whole existing system — and let other nations meet the diminishing demand for cars in the USA. This would be a “best case” scenario. (Other nations may decide to go further up the Happy Motoring road at their own eventual peril.)

My second conclusion is not so appetizing, namely that the bankruptcy of General Motors may set in motion a chain of events that will accelerate the destructive unwind of the bad credit economy, the damage to our bond values, the loss of faith in our currency, and the authority and legitimacy of our leaders. This last dire outcome might be allayed if, say, President Obama directed his policy efforts to the items in the paragraph above, that is, a reality-based agenda for true change in how we live — but who can feel confident about that happening these days? Maybe it will take a horrifying chain of events to get Mr. Obama there. And then, tragically, he may be overwhelmed by the chain of events itself. I hope not.

Waking Up from the Happy Motoring Dream was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder. Visit Laissez Faire Books for the best selection of libertarian book titles.

At the moment, there is tremendous hoopla and jubilation over the start-up of so many “shovel-ready” highway projects around America — as if what we need most are additional circumferential freeways to enhance the Happy Motoring lifestyle. How insane are we? Is this the only thing we know how to do?

I remain confident that the months ahead will introduce the American public and our leaders to a range of horrors that will begin to penetrate our addled collective imagination. We’re far from done with the crisis of banking and money and the related fiasco in mortgages — which translates into the very real situation of many people becoming homeless. It remains to be seen what may happen on the food production scene, but the current severe shortage of capital and the intense droughts shaping up around the world will resolve into a much clearer picture by mid-summer. The price of oil has resumed marching up and has now re-entered a range ($50-plus) that spun the airline industry into bankruptcy last time around. Enough carnage has already occurred on the jobs scene that the next act among many chronically jobless may tilt toward desperation, anger, and violence. The sporting goods shops around the nation are already rationing ammunition.

It’s not just the stock markets that have decoupled from reality as we enjoy the fragrant vapors of spring — it’s the entire conscious consensus of everybody holding the levers of power and opinion. To put it as simply as possible, we’re still sleepwalking into the future.

Bad Collateral

The wishes of the “green shoots and mustard seed” crowd really hinge on whether the various organs of the suburban economy can be jump-started back to life — the production home-builders, the granite countertop outfitters, the mall and strip-mall gang, the national chain discount retailers, all the people who make Happy Motoring possible from the factory to the showroom, and, of course, the banks who shovel money into these enterprises.

All these organs of our now-former economy are gravely impaired, and a realistic appraisal of them would have to conclude that they’ve entered the zone of congestive failure. The choice we face really comes down to this: do we put our dwindling resources and “hopes” into resuscitating those dying systems, or do we move forward to the next chapter of American life, cut our losses, and make new arrangements more consistent with the realities on offer from the universe? To take it a step further, can we remain one nation, a common culture, without such a conscious re-purposing of our collective spirit?

The bizarre spectacle being played out right now by President Obama and his team only adds layers of mystery and mystification to this big question. It is so dispiriting to see Mr. Obama’s White House mount a campaign to sustain the unsustainable in the economic realm. Everything they’ve done for four months involving money management and enterprise policy — from backstopping hopeless banks, to gaming the bankruptcies of the big car companies, to the bungled efforts to prop up artificially-high house prices — amounts to a gigantic exercise in futility. Worse, it gives off odors of dishonesty or stupidity, since the ominous tendings of our system are so starkly self-evident.

Not least of the problems entailed in all this are the scary political consequences. It’s one thing for a business such as a bank to fail; its another thing for the public to lose confidence in banking, or their own currency, or the credibility of all the people who work in banking, or the authority of those charged to regulate these activities, or the courts and their officers who are supposed to adjudicate misconduct in them. When faith in all these things starts to go, all bets are off for even larger social constructs like democracy, justice, and the destiny of a federal republic.

The Obama White House has very quickly painted itself into a corner on these things. The so-called bank “stress test” couldn’t have backfired more completely. Rather than bolster confidence in our money system and the people who run it, it only made the system appear more obviously corrupt. It made the Treasury Department (and the White House by extension) look idiotic for concocting it. Worse, the game of allowing the banks to audit themselves, and cook their books under newly jiggered accounting rules, only made them look less sound and trustworthy, and their executives more venal and mendacious. The stress test scam also virtually guaranteed that the banks will not get another dime out of congress — even while it is common knowledge that they will desperately need quadrillions more dimes in the months ahead.

Who knows what the point of this ludicrous exercise was? Observers in all corners of the media saw through it, and the public has only been made more cynical, and is now so furious over related stunts like AIG using taxpayer money to pay back swaps bets to Goldman Sachs that there is a whiff of revolution in the American air for the first time, really, since 1861. A lot of reasonable people see a good chance that our society will sink into disorder if these trends continue, and these fears could beat a path into radical politics, even the frightful prospect of coup d’etat — not something that I advocate, by the way.

The president is playing with fire on all this. The old economy is not going to recover, and so far he has not used his rhetorical talents to articulate what the next economy is likely to be about. It is reasonable to wonder whether he even really has a clear sense of it — and, based on the fatuous utterances of his economic mandarins like Larry Summers and Austan Goolsby, this team is really behind the curve.

There are plenty of things you can state about the economy past and future with some confidence right now:

• Cheap energy is over and our wishes for alt.energy are currently inconsistent with reality, meaning we have to live differently.

• We have to downscale and re-localize our major economic activities: food production, commerce and manufacturing, banking, schooling, etc.

• We can’t hope to have a stable money system unless we allow a workout of unpayable debt to proceed.

• Even if we can do this, universal easy credit is a thing of the past. From now on, we have to save for the things we want and run our businesses and households on accounts receivable.

• Major demographic shifts are inevitable as it becomes necessary to let go of suburbia and reactivate our derelict towns and smaller cities (and allow our giant metroplexes to contract).

• We have to face the truth that our major social contracts cannot be met, namely the continuation of social security as we know it and probably all pension arrangements. We’ll probably have to change household arrangements to make up for these losses.

• Health care will have to go through a revolution more comprehensive than just changing how we pay for it. Like everything else, it will have to downscale, re-localize, and become more rigorous.

We’re not going to rescue the banks. The collateral for their loans is no good and it will only lose more value. All those tract houses on the cul-de-sacs of America and scattered on the out-parcels of our tragically subdivided farming landscape will only lose value, one way or another, in the years ahead. Right now they’re simply losing inflated cash value — and that has been bad enough to sink the banks. In the months and years ahead, they’ll lose their sheer usefulness as the distances once mitigated by cheap gasoline loom larger again, and the jobs vanish and incomes with them, and the supermarket shelves cease to groan with eighty-seven different varieties of flavored coffee creamers, and one-by-one the national chain stores shutter, and the theme parks, and the NASCAR ovals, and the malls, and the colossal superfluous cretin-cargo of consumer nonsense that we’ve been daydreaming in gets blown away in a hurricane of change that we were not ready to believe in.

Regards,
James Howard Kunstler

May 19, 2009

Shoveling Money into the Deceased Economy was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder. Visit Laissez Faire Books for the best selection of libertarian book titles.