There has not been a chairman of the Federal Reserve Board with sound monetary instincts since Paul Volcker resigned in 1987. It was Volcker who brought the dollar back from the brink of hyperinflation in 1987.

On May 14, Volcker testified before Congress. Scattered around the monetary world, and particularly influential in Europe, there is a group of central bankers who admire Volcker, as I do myself, and share his analysis of the present situation. The Volcker analysis is very similar to that of the European Central Bank, and to that of Mervyn King, the governor of the Bank of England.

Volcker testified that the Fed ought now tackle the threat of inflation more forcefully. He is particularly concerned about the danger of a return to the conditions of “stagflation” of the 1970s. The Bank of England also expects that the next two years will see the pressure of rising inflation combined with low rates of growth. In the 1970s, this unpleasant combination of economic trends resulted from the loose monetary conditions of the early 1970s and the oil shocks of the mid-1970s.

Those who experienced the 1970s were taught a painful lesson about the negative effects of inflation. In standard monetary theory, some emphasis is given to the initial phases of inflation, in which an increasing money supply funds economic expansion and tends to cause booms, bubbles, and speculation.

Less attention is usually given to the second stage of inflation, in which prices rise; interest rates are increased; and economic growth rates, after an acceleration, begin to slow down. There is an illusion that inflation is good for growth; that is true of the first stage, but only of the first stage. Staglation, in which rising prices are accompanied by reduced growth, comes as a second stage.

Volcker warned Congress that he saw a “resemblance” between present monetary conditions today and those of the early 1970s, when the economy had an overall tendency toward rising prices, including big increases in energy and agricultural prices. He observed, “If we lose confidence in the ability and the willingness of the Federal Reserve to deal with inflationary presses and to sustain confidence in the dollar, we’ll be in real trouble.”

On the same day, the Bank of England published its latest quarterly forecasts and came to much the same conclusions. The bank’s inflation projections will not return to the 2% target figure until early 2010, which suggest that it will have no room for rate cuts until then.

Britain and the United States have different political cycles. The next presidential election in the United States will come nearly two years earlier than the next British general election; the latest date for a British general election will be June 2010. The Bank of England’s economic forecast suggests that there is little chance of interest rate cuts much before that time. The government’s reluctant tax cut on the lowest income tax band will strengthen the bank’s hand in keeping interest rates at their present level.

Mervyn King observed that “The consequences of price increases would be a squeeze on real take-home pay that will slow consumer spending and output growth, perhaps sharply.”

There exists what might be termed the Volcker consensus that inflation has returned as the real threat to world economic conditions. This consensus includes Paul Volcker himself, the Bank of England, and the European Central Bank. It does not include Ben Bernanke, the Fed, or the current president of the United States. After November, we may find out whether it includes the next president of the U.S.

Regards,
Lord William Rees-Mogg
May 15, 2008

The Danger of Stagflation was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

The Bank of England has published the latest issue of its twice-yearly Financial Stability Report. The Financial Times leads on the story under the optimistic heading “Bank of England Signals Worst Is Over.” The report’s argument was summarized by John Gieve, the deputy governor of the bank: “While there remain downside risks, the most likely path ahead is that confidence and risk appetite will return gradually in the coming months.” The bank’s optimism extends even to the U.S. housing market.

Even with a further decline in U.S. house prices, the bank does not expect any default in AAA-rated subprime mortgage-backed securities. That means that those securities are significantly undervalued and that some of the writing down has been much greater than necessary.

This optimistic review was published on the day that the Federal Reserve cut interest rates by a further quarter percentage point, to 2%. This was only slightly mitigated by the Fed’s hint that there might be a pause in rate cuts at the next meeting, in June.

There is now a very wide gap between the interest rate philosophy of European central banks, including the Bank of England, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. The Europeans have shown little willingness to counter the credit crunch by large and repeated interest rate cuts. The Fed has continued to follow the much-criticized Alan Greenspan policy of cutting rates early and often.

The pessimistic American view is supported by most New York opinion. Jim O’Neill, the chief economist of Goldman Sachs, says that Britain is “in the eye of the storm of a deleveraging world economy… The U.K. mortgage market is effectively frozen. House prices are going to go through negative changes. It’s going to be a challenge for U.K. policymakers.” This American view has even penetrated to the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, where an American member of the committee, David Blanchflower, has said that a 30% fall in house prices by 2010 is not implausible. Such a fall would be comparable to the fall in house prices in the United States.

My own view is that the Bank of England is probably premature in spotting a turn in the market. For some time yet, banks will be rewriting their capital bases. They will be concerned to reassure themselves and their customers about their own financial situation and will, therefore, remain risk averse and reluctant to lend. The banks have had a very nasty fright, in which it was impossible to value major investments and difficult to be sure of the true solvency position of major banks. That was a global phenomenon.

It may be true that the worst of the immediate panic has passed, but the mood of caution, even of exaggerated caution, has not. There are also, in the U.K., problems with the falling valuation of commercial property that are as worrying as the concerns about U.K. residential policy. The Bank of England wants to help restore confidence, but it will take time for banks to return to their more relaxed attitude to the lending risk. Indeed, the Bank of England would not want them to go back to the mood of 2006, when lending standards were too low.

However, the European view is not merely one of optimism about the future trend of asset values, but one of greater pessimism about inflation. Record prices for property may have peaked; some commodities, including gold, have reacted, as well. But energy and food prices are at record levels and have not yet turned down.

European bankers remain relatively anxious about the threat of a return to inflation. That is why European Central Bankers are reluctant to follow the Fed in cutting interest rates. The Bank of England is also worried about the rising budget deficit of the British government. High interest rates tend to offset the inflationary effect of the deficit, which itself seems to be rising by the day.

I find it easy to see the pessimistic case. I expect the U.K. housing and commercial property markets to continue to fall. In London, they are very closely linked. I expect the U.K. budget deficit to continue to rise. I expect Bank of England interest rate policy to remain cautious, as will that of the European Central Bank. I expect these financial conditions to continue in 2009, and probably 2010, as well. There is not all that much encouragement for optimism.

Regards,
Lord William Rees-Mogg
May 1, 2008

Fed Effects on Europe was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported another sharp increase in producer prices during March. Finished goods were up 1.1 percent and intermediate-level goods rose 2.3 percent, pushing the year-over-year rates to 6.9 percent and 10.6 percent, respectively, in the month of March — the biggest yearly increases in this price indicator since 1981.

U.S. consumer prices rose four percent year over year, pushing the high end of a 15-year range. And you can bet the reality is worse than what the government data will confess.

The U.K. also reported a 6.2 percent year-over-year gain in its headline PPI. I mention it because the pound has been stronger than the greenback in recent years — but the inflation story is not just about the dollar. The buildup of inflation pressures overseas will soon be evident — when the foreign currency bubble pops.

You’re seeing a price revolution unfold before your very eyes. Media reports of truckers and consumers angry over escalating fuel prices are becoming more frequent and intense, as are the reports of riots over soaring food prices in some corners of the world. Cost inflation continues to ravage mining project economics, hampering the industry’s ability to increase production in response to higher prices.

The ultimate cause of both price inflation and the business (boom-bust) cycle lies in the constant manipulation of money supply and interest rate levels by central banks and their governments.

The economic data, meanwhile, continue to point to recession. Instead of letting the market correct the dislocation — heaven forbid — central bankers, under pressure from the electorate, are but fanning the flames with price pressures already at two-decade highs.

Working off the same defunct Phillips Curve dynamic (the consumptionist theory of a trade-off between inflation and unemployment) that formed the monetary policy playbook of the ‘70s, the Federal Reserve is hoping a weak economy will weigh down prices. Yet even using this theory, one can see that if the Fed is successful at averting recession, what will keep prices down?

There is no end in sight for this vicious cycle but hyperinflation if the policy continues.

But more relevant to the present, the idea that slower economic growth might relieve price pressures that are concomitantly fueled by monetary policy is limited by global factors that many have alluded to over the past year or two — a worldwide slowdown in the growth of the real pool of savings, a switch from mercantilism to consumption policies in developing countries and slower productivity growth.

As one economist recently put it (emphasize mine):

“Past bouts of expansion have created bubbles in the financial sector, plus other sectors such as housing and state-dominated sectors like medicine and education. But a high dollar internationally, the growth of the international division of labor as well as technological advance kept the prices of consumer goods down, even falling. All these effects have been absorbed already, and the falling dollar relative to other international currencies has meant a higher price on imports. Lower productivity contributes, as well, as does the general recessionary environment. So the downward price pressure on consumer goods is at an end.”

So a contraction in production just makes the situation worse. Tell it to the Fed. Or just buy gold.

Your golden bull,

Ed Bugos
April 30, 2008

Inflation in a Slowdown was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

“Four charts, one metal, and the whole world wrapped up in trying to price risk and reward in a fast-shrinking currency…”

YOU CAN LINK THE HISTORIC SURGE in gold prices starting mid-August 2007 to many apparently disparate things.

Pick the right link and you might be able to tell whether it’s worth you buying or holding gold today.

One such link is the price of money, as decided by the U.S. Federal Reserve. Gold’s stellar 58 percent gain in the seven months starting Aug. 18 began with the Fed’s first change to U.S. interest rates in 18 months.

Last August’s 0.25 percent cut to the Fed’s “discount rate” — the interest rate it charges commercial banks to borrow short-term funds — was the Fed’s first interest rate cut since July 2003. By the end of March 2008, it became a 3.0 percent cut to the bank’s key fed funds target.

And gold’s initial jump turned into a pole vault…

The real cost of borrowing dollars — or, rather, the real returns paid to anyone saving money today — clearly impacts the demand for investment gold.

You can measure this real rate of interest quite simply. Just subtract the rate of consumer price inflation (CPI) from the fed funds interest rate, as in the chart above.

Then compare this changing value to the price of gold and you’ll see that when the real returns paid to cash sink below zero, investors and savers tend to pay more — or demand more — for gold.

That’s what investors and savers did in the 1970s. It’s what they then did NOT do again until real U.S. interest rates sank toward and below zero during the first six years of this decade.

Why choose gold when real interest rates sink? Because if central bankers, driven by a fear of “deflation” in asset prices and consumer spending, try to stop the public from hoarding cash, then people will seek out reliable stores of value instead, led by hard assets.

Unlike real estate, however, gold bullion remains a highly liquid, easily priced asset that can store huge quantities of wealth in a very small space.

And gold, as the action since August’s first Fed cut reminds us, has acted as a reliable store of wealth for more than 5,000 years. In times of monetary destruction, or so history says, it’s human nature to seek an escape from fast-shrinking currencies:

Another important connection — also related to the Fed’s new rate-cutting cycle — sits in the currency markets.

In particular, look at the euro/dollar exchange rate. Because as the dollar sank versus the euro in the back half of 2007, daily movements in the U.S. dollar gold price were more strongly linked to the euro than they were to crude oil, the broad commodity markets, and even the price of silver — gold’s poor cousin in the precious metals market.

This “correlation coefficient” would stand at zero if gold’s daily movements bore no relationship whatsoever to the euro. It would be negative if gold rose when the euro slipped back (as happened to oil in the fall, albeit marginally, as the chart shows above). The correlation would stand at 1.00 if they always moved together in lock step.

And as of last month, gold and the euro were more tightly connected (with a correlation of 0.62) than gold and crude oil (0.45) or gold and the broad Goldman Sachs Commodities Index (0.29).

What does this tell us? First, the gold price is behaving much more like a currency than it is acting like a raw material. This is unsurprising given what little use gold has as anything other than a store of value.

Barely 15 percent of last year’s total gold fabrication worldwide ended up in either electronics as gold bonding wire, coating for space shuttle windows, or in people’s teeth as dental fillings. But that lack of apparent practical use — which actually grew by 49 tonnes from 1998, to total 411 tonnes in 2007 — doesn’t mean gold is useless.

You’d hardly say the European single currency holds zero value, correct? But you try fueling a jet engine or building a highway with euros today and no end of bloggers and financial hacks will step up to say your failed experiment just proves that it’s useless.

That’s why smart institutions such as the Royal Bank of Canada trade gold alongside the euro on their currency desks, rather than handing it to their commodity teams. If you think the long-term decline of the dollar is only set to grow worse, you might want to consider joining them:

As you can see, the gold price in euros has risen by more than 160 percent from its lows of 1999, even as the European currency has surged against the dollar.

The upshot? Don’t be misled by that strengthening correlation between gold and the euro. You would still have better rewarded a bearish view of the greenback in gold than in the European single currency or any other major world money. And while the euro has risen 48 percent against the dollar since March 2003, gold outpaced that gain by a further 97 percent on top.

But just before you open a new Internet window and type “Buy gold” into Google today, hang fire for a moment. Because yes, the dollar’s 12 percent loss versus the euro has somehow created a 28 percent gain for European gold investors since last August. And yes, again, the Fed’s new rate-cutting campaign still has no firm end — let alone a reverse — in sight.

But if everything’s lined up for a fresh surge in world gold prices, why did the market pull back so sharply in the middle of March? Plunging 15 percent from its new all-time record above $1,030 per ounce, the gold market now stands some $100 lower. The euro, in contrast, has risen since then. So too has the oil price.

The latest cut to Fed interest rates lopped another 0.75 percent off the gross returns paid to dollars, as well. So why the big swoon?

“This sharp reversal in price cannot be explained by a stronger U.S. dollar,” notes the team at Virtual Metals in London, writing in the April edition of Metals Monthly on behalf of Fortis Bank. “Gold’s decline measured in euros has been larger than in dollars.

“Nor can [the drop] be explained by a reduction in inflationary expectations, as this hasn’t happened,” they go on. “Instead, it seems to be narrowly based on improving sentiment in the credit markets…”

This chart “shows a close relationship since October 2007 between the gold price and the benchmark Markit CDX investment grade index, which measures the risk of credit-swap defaults,” explain Matt Turner, Gary Mead, and Jessica Cross at Virtual Metals.

In plain English, the Markit CDX measures the cost of buying insurance against nonpayment by 100 big corporate borrowers in the United States. And “As the Bear Stearns panic subsided, the index fell sharply, and so did gold.”

Meaning? Gold didn’t only surge on the Fed’s rate-cutting frenzy to mid-March. It also gained as institutional investors ran for cover amid the world-banking crisis — a crisis yet to end.

No one’s to create at will, gold is also no one’s liability — not if it’s owned outright, rather than as a mere credit on a gold dealer’s ledger. Incredibly, London professionals have told BullionVault that around 97 percent of the world’s gold dealing takes place on this kind of “unallocated” basis, attaching a real risk of default to the vast bulk of day-to-day gold trading.

Perhaps that concern explains why, alongside gold futures and exchange-traded gold trust funds, the latest GFMS analysis notes “healthy growth” in physical gold bullion investments, “mainly in allocated accounts.”

This market in late 2007 “was dominated by institutional and high-net worth investors,” the group’s Gold Survey 2008 goes on. “Many of the latter bought gold as a safe haven, soon after the subprime credit crisis erupted.”

Demand from smaller retail investors, in contrast, “grew over the year (and notably in the last couple of months), but its contribution to total investment remained marginal overall.”

In short, the mass of private investors and savers still have yet to buy gold, or even consider it. So if you were concerned that gold might be reaching some kind of bubble, you might want to consider the absence of “last fools” to date.

You might also want to note that, so far, the threat of U.S. corporations defaulting on their debt obligations has been more imagined than real. Just what happens to the price of insuring corporate risk — and the resulting dash into gold — when debt defaults really do start to turn higher?

Regards,
Adrian Ash
BullionVault
April 16, 2008

The Case for Gold was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

Financial upheaval owes homage to derivatives that shrouded the massive growth in debt and leverage. This murky world inflated the incentives of those who ran the machinery over the cliff — bankers, mortgage brokers, law firms, appraisers, rating agencies, politicians, and on it goes. This is well known. Despite protestations, the parties knew they were behaving either recklessly or criminally at the time. The Federal Reserve encouraged them.

With a straight face, Hank Paulson proposes that the Fed quash future imbroglios. Yet the terracotta soldiers of Xian would bring more initiative to the assignment.

In September 1998, the Federal Reserve didn’t have the slightest idea of how the banking system functioned; it hadn’t the slightest idea of the banks’ exposure to hedge funds; nor had it the slightest idea of the leverage within the financial system. Maybe these deficiencies are excusable, although the Federal Reserve was responsible for regulating bank holding companies (the holding companies being where much of the risk was housed). It is unpardonable in the aftermath, having learned of its own deficiencies, that the Federal Reserve made no effort to improve its oversight or to warn of the dangers it had recently discovered. Instead, the Fed encouraged devious practices.

In the first three weeks of September 1998, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a Greenwich, Conn., hedge fund, lost half a billion dollars per week and everyone knew it. Except, possibly, Alan Greenspan. In mid-September, the Federal Reserve chairman told the House Banking Committee that “Hedge funds [are] strongly regulated by those who lend the money.” On Sept. 21, LTCM lost $550 million. In a virtuoso rejection of every financial institution’s model, all security prices went down. This is normal. In a panic, everyone sells.

The Fed’s lackluster oversight was partly to blame. On May 2, 1998, Alan Greenspan gave a speech in which he emphasized the advantages of “private market regulation.” Greenspan explained, “Rapidly changing technology has begun to render obsolete much of the bank examination regime established in earlier decades. Bank regulators are perforce now being pressed to depend increasingly on ever more complex and sophisticated private market regulation… One of the key lessons from U.S. banking history [is] that counterparty supervision is still the first line of regulatory defense.” He also noted the Federal Reserve’s decision to supervise “risk management procedures, rather than actual portfolios.” The Fed now evaluated how banks monitored their own risks (e.g., their modeling techniques, the process used to monitor counterparties) in lieu of examining specific securities.

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) held a conference call on Sept. 29, 1998. The staff and Federal Reserve governors briefed Greenspan on Long-Term Capital Management’s counterparties — the banks that lent to LTCM. He was told that none of the banks, with the exception of Bankers Trust, had an up-to-date balance sheet for LTCM. Even this was “only a small piece of [Bankers’] whole action because so much of the latter is off balance sheet.” When assets are off balance sheet, the bank’s motivation to “strongly regulate” is diminished.

The Federal Reserve chairman was at a loss: “The question is why it happened in the first place. Is it just that the lenders were dazzled by the people at LTCM and did not take a close look?” Vice Chairman William McDonough replied there “was in place a credit system that made a great deal of sense.” In the next sentence — which simply cannot have been an explanation of this sensible system — McDonough told the FOMC: “For at least some of the lenders, there was no initial margin requirement.” McDonough went on to suggest the Federal Reserve might have taken more initiative: “We do not regulate the firm. But given the number of institutions they dealt with around the world, was there a way that should have enabled us to be more aware of their overall position? One is inclined to say, ‘You bet.’ But exactly how we could have done that I am not so sure.”

This was not the time for the FOMC to design a regulatory apparatus, but the Greenspan Fed never did attempt to fill this gap. In retirement, Greenspan reminds his audiences that the Fed does not regulate hedge funds. True, but the Fed could have worked backward from the foundation that McDonough had suggested. (The SEC is responsible for monitoring broker-dealers. It, too, has failed miserably.) The need for adult supervision of banks was obvious when a staffer commented on the conference call, “It is something of a signature for [LTCM] to insist that if a counterparty wanted to deal with them, there would be no initial margin. Not many other firms have gotten away with that.” For this reason alone, the Fed should have geared up its watchdogs to better monitor the suicidal banking system it regulated.

Another staff member enlightened the FOMC with a frightful prospect: “The counterparties…get comfortable with zero percent margin. But from the [financial] system’s point of view, zero initial margin permits an essentially unlimited amount of leverage. There is no constraint other than the exhaustion on the part of the counterparties.” Greenspan and Bernanke fiddled with their slide rules as financial derivatives grew to 10 times the world’s GDP. In 2007, Bernanke should have known that banks, in a desperate attempt keep dancing, were borrowing at five percent to lend at four percent.

Greenspan was vexed: “It is one thing for one bank to have failed to appreciate what was happening to [LTCM], but this list of [banks without knowledge of LTCM’s positions] is just mind-boggling.” So boggled was the man that the Greenspan (and Bernanke) Fed allowed the banks to lever as never before and write $400 trillion worth of derivatives between then and 2008 — without so much as a dollar bill of reserves: Nor a peep that maybe these off-balance-sheet liabilities might bear closer attention.

A staff member described what he had learned on his field trip to LTCM. On Aug. 31, the hedge fund had a $125 billion balance sheet. It also had $1.4 trillion of off-balance-sheet assets. On Sept. 21, when it appears (from the transcript) the Fed first saw LTCM’s balance sheet, its leverage was 55-to-1 and the “off-balance-sheet leverage was 100-to-1 or 200-to-1 — I don’t know how to calculate it.” He wasn’t alone. Greenspan’s “first line of regulatory defense” didn’t know if LTCM was trading interest rate swaps or stolen cars. The models of LTCM’s “counterparty supervision” were so “complex and sophisticated” that the hedge fund’s portfolio had been translated into a Greek salad — gammas, thetas, and epsilons.

For practical purposes, LTCM had no capital by Sept. 29. It was not able to meet margin calls. The hedge fund had not been required to post margin, but was required to post collateral worth 100 percent of the assets it borrowed. Even this looked amateurish. Greenspan, a former director of J.P. Morgan, shared his view: “If I am a bank lender and I lend $200 million to a hedge find, ordinarily, I would be overcollateralized. I would hold more than $200 billion in, say, U.S. Treasury bills.” Greenspan asked if the collateral was U.S. Treasuries. A staffer replied: “U.S. Treasuries, Danish government bonds, BBB credits — you name it.” Beanie Babies were next on the list. The value of LTCM’s collateral was falling. The balance sheets of the banks LTCM traded with were sinking.

A staffer explained the risk: “I’m going to say this in plain English. If markets keep moving away from [LTCM] in the wrong direction, their future exposure could be large and they might not have the collateral at that point in time to cover the exposure.” McDonough had described the house of cards earlier: “The firm’s position in a variety of instruments was very large. What my contacts were talking about was the effect that the failure of the firm would have on world markets if all these positions had to be dumped on the markets. People who thought they had an offsetting position with [LTCM] would suddenly find that they did not have one. They would suddenly find themselves with big open positions…” Globalization might end in a financial meltdown.

A Fed staffer thought the banks “were saying the right things in terms of the kinds of risk management processes they had in place” but “the question is how effectively the banks were actually implementing them…” The Fed staff had not taken the initiative to check. Greenspan was told the Federal Reserve had not examined the banks since December 1997. In Greenspan’s remaining decade at the helm, his bureaucrats produced masterful studies on counterparty risk, but permitted the banks’ risk models to optimize executive bonus compensation.

This is interesting, but not of great utility in 2008. The 1998 Fed weaknesses are important because the molehill grew into a mountain. Greenspan and Bernanke chaired the most egregious administrative failure in financial history. Paulson’s proposal is on a par with Caligula’s decision to name his horse consul.

In March 1999, Greenspan gave a speech on derivatives. He might have wandered onto the podium from Mars. Derivatives “are an increasingly important vehicle for unbundling risk.” He doused the post-LTCM movement toward a better form of regulation: “Some may now argue that the periodic emergence of financial panics implies a need to abandon models-based approaches to regulatory capital and to return to traditional approaches based on regulatory risk schemes. In my view, this would be a major mistake.” The regulators’ risk models “are much less accurate than banks’ risk measurement models.” The Federal Reserve is not the institution to lead the much-needed bank regulation.

The nominal value of derivative contracts held by U.S. commercial banks (those over which the Fed has direct regulatory authority) leapt from $33 trillion at the end of 1998 to $101 trillion at the end of 2005, about the time Greenspan left office. We mustn’t ignore Greenspan’s successor: By the second quarter of 2007, 18 months later, these banks held $153 trillion in derivatives. The collapsing financial system is in the early stage of unwinding. Ben Bernanke has had time as Fed chairman to do something — anything — to slow the production of bad debt. Instead, the rate of financial claims in the economy accelerated.

The virtues of derivatives (their ability to diversify risk away from the banking system) received full approval from Greenspan and, more to the point, from his audiences. Bernanke is considered a monetary genius. Will we ever learn? Someday, we might ridicule, rather than praise, the Fed. On that day, it should be disbanded.

Regards,
Fred Sheehan
April 14, 2008

Mistakes at the Federal Reserve was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

Better still, imagine they spell out the words “your savings” instead. Here’s goes…

“We need concerted action by governments, central banks and market participants to help stop this wave [of liquidations]…”

— Josef Ackerman, head of Deutsche Bank, speaking in Frankfurt on March 17

“The government is prepared to do what it takes to maintain the stability of our financial system…”

— U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson to Fox News, March 16

“In every country in 2008, every government has one aim — to maintain stability through the world economic slowdown. Britain with its central role in the world’s financial system is no exception…”

— U.K. Finance Minister Alistair Darling, in his Budget speech of March 12

Not quite with it yet? Check these examples, already done for you…

“The U.S. tax-payer last week agreed to help J.P.Morgan acquire Bear Stearns after a run on Bear, once the second-biggest underwriter of US mortgage bonds. In an effort to shore up Wall Street’s other firms, you also agreed to become lender of last resort to all 20 primary dealers in Treasury notes…” (Bloomberg)

“U.S. leveraged institutions, which include banks, brokers-dealers, hedge funds and tax-sponsored enterprises, will suffer roughly $460 billion in credit losses after loan loss provisions, Goldman Sachs economists wrote in a research note released late on Monday…” (Reuters)

“The [investment] banking system is facing the 21st-century equivalent of the wave of bank runs that swept America in the early 1930s. And your money is rushing in to help, with hundreds of billions from the tax payer, and hundreds of billions more from tax-sponsored institutions like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks…” (Paul Krugman in the NY Times)

With it now? Great fun, isn’t it! Just cut to the chase about bailouts and financial aid by remembering what the state’s big generous hand-outs are made from — your tax payments, both current and future, plus the spending power of your savings, ripe for inflating away by elected officials and their unelected agents and staff.

This game beats playing “Spoof” any day, we reckon…which is funny again when you come to think about it.

Because Spoof — played in pubs and bars across the world to decide who buys the next round of drinks — is a game without winners, only a loser. Exactly like this game, then.

Fancy another cocktail before playing (and paying) again?

“We need a continuing message from tax payers and cash savers around the world that they will do what it takes to support economic growth. That will not be easy. It may necessitate taking some risks with inflation. But the message has to be unambiguous…”

So said John Varley — or as near as damn it — in a long open letter to government, published by The Banker magazine at the start of this month.

Varley is group chief of Barclays bank here in London. According to the annual report released on Thursday, he took home £2.4 million last year ($4.8m), just down from his 2006 payout of £2.5m after annual group profits fell 1% to £7.08 billion “due to the global financial turmoil” as the BBC puts it.

Don’t get me wrong here; I have no problems — moral or otherwise — with the concept of multi-million-dollar salaries. Executive pay merely puts flesh on those inequities which life itself thrives upon. The profit motive in finance is precisely what created the joint-stock company, mortgage lending, the safety-net of insurance, credit cards, overdrafts and all the other monetary tools developed by Homo economicus in the last five hundred years.

But what sticks in the craw and makes us choke on our martini-olives, however, is the “privatization of profit [and] the socialization of loss” as Martin Wolf calls it in the Financial Times. Every time the bankers screw up, your money steps in to patch up the losses. Letting the crisis wear on is simply not possible, because no one has dared to try it before. “The authorities feel compelled to intervene,” writes Charles Kindleberger in his history of Manias, Panics & Crashes. “The dominant argument against the view that panics can be cured by being left alone is that they almost never are left alone.”

Hence the pleading from Wall Street and Washington alike.

“Tax-payers need to continue to supply liquidity,” Varley’s article in The Banker very nearly goes on, “and they can help the restarting of the residential mortgage-backed security and commercial mortgage-backed securities markets by being prepared to accept this paper as collateral.”

More than that, “it would have a significantly (and disproportionately) positive impact if your cash savings were to buy commercial paper.”

Ain’t you brave, gentle reader, stepping into the breach so gamely like this! And so modest, too. Thanks to you covering Wall Street’s losses with your tax-dollars, “we’re going to have maybe a mild recession, but we’re going to avoid anything worse,” reckons Jeremy Siegel, professor of economics at Wharton.

Yet the plaudits will go to somebody else, with nary a murmur from you, reckons Siegel. “[Ben] Bernanke may very well easily turn out to be a hero here,” he explains.

Which I guess was precisely your aim in putting money aside to provide for your future.

“Systemically important institutions must pay for any official protection they receive,” Martin Wolf continues for the Financial Times. “Their ability to enjoy the upside on the risks they run, while shifting parts of the downside on to society at large, must be restricted.

“This is not just a matter of simple justice (although it is that, too). It is also a matter of efficiency. An unregulated, but subsidized, casino will not allocate resources well.”

This quid pro quo — the “this for that” stated so bluntly by Varley at Barclays and Ackerman at Deutsche Bank — is fast-becoming the surest financial consensus in history. If we bail out the banks to stop their stupidity creating a second Great Depression, they must accept far tighter regulation by those governments and bureaucrats who step in to save the day. No redemption without legislation.

Thing is, of course, we’ve all been before. Across the world, hundreds of times. New regulations come in to stall the last crash…and a new complex system of finance sprouts up, thriving on excessive risk, which ends up needing your money — your tax receipts and your savings – to mop up the mess when it explodes in turn.

From Barnard’s Act of 1734 — which sought “to prevent the infamous practice of stock-jobbing” that had already peaked and exploded with the South Sea Bubble 14 years earlier — through to Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, which tried to stop Enron and Worldcom once they had crashed, new standards come in after it matters. Financial risk-taking, meantime, simply moves on to find new ways to gear up, using the latest regulations to pin-point those loopholes that will, in due course, be closed up when it no longer counts.

“After the collapse of Equitable Life in 2000,” notes a letter to The Times of London today, “the Financial Services Authority [U.K. watchdog] set up a review team on the regulation of the assurance society. Among the important ‘lessons to be learnt,’ identified in 2001 were — and I quote verbatim — that ‘the FSA management take steps to ensure that the supervisory team is properly constituted with persons with the necessary expertise and knowledge’…

“[Yet] from the recent internal audit by the FSA on its regulation of Northern Rock [the top five mortgage lender which blew up in Sept. 2007] we learn that the bank ‘was monitored by supervisors with expertise in insurance, not banking’…”

More than that, the FSA failed to conduct a proper review of Northern Rock’s operations for the entire 18-month period leading up to its collapse. Even then, prior to that last full review of Feb. 2006 — and “contrary to standard practice” as this week’s official report into the scandal revealed — “formal records of key meetings were not prepared.”

Thus the quid pro quo of bailouts for new rules becomes, in the end, a straight swap of excessive risk for incompetence. Underpinning this long-run historical fact you’ll find the assumption that “if one cannot control expansion of credit in boom, one should at least try to halt contraction of credit in crisis,” as Charles Kindleberger concludes.

For you, the taxpayer and saver, all that means is you get to pay twice — first in higher deductions and then through inflation.

Bet you’re glad Ben Bernanke will get all the thanks.

Cheers!
Adrian Ash
BullionVault
April 4, 2008

Who Pays for the Bailout was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

Today, with progressive calls for action in the face of crisis, the Fed’s tentacles are potentially reaching directly into the credit and securities markets. This week alone, the headlines are rife with news of its “sweeping” new powers under Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson’s “plan.”

The Federal Reserve is in the midst of another historic interest rate-cutting campaign. Its official policy stance is that it recognizes the inflation risks, but worries more about growth, so it will inflate to sustain “growth.”

Its message has been, more or less, that money grows on trees, which is why Ben Bernanke’s moniker, “Helicopter” Ben, is catching on with the press. Gold bugs could not be more thrilled. Just recently, I wrote that we are seeing the best of all worlds for gold to shoot straight up a few hundred points.

But wait! “It’s not such a sure thing.” At least that’s what I thought I heard…from a voice in the wilderness. “What do you mean it’s not a sure thing? Look at ‘em flood the markets with liquidity. $100 billion here, a few hundred there.”

As I was about to sign off, the voice continued: “No, they are not inflating. They’re just creating confidence in the credit markets. Look at the ‘money’ numbers,” said the voice. “Forget credit. Look at the level of bank reserves and the adjusted monetary base. They haven’t grown since August. The Bernanke Fed is just pretending to inflate!”

Perhaps I already knew what the voice was telling me. Like the title character in Tolstoy’s classic novel, The Death of Ivan Ilych, I was doing some soul searching and discovering hidden truths buried deep beneath the surface. The voice was my own, and it was telling me something I had yet to consider.

It has not escaped my attention that the narrow constituents of money supply are not expanding. I’ve written about it.

This disinflation was first apparent as far back as 2005, under Alan Greenspan’s tenure, when M1 growth hit zero percent on a year-over-year basis. He set it in motion through the rate hike campaign. The total value for U.S. M1 has not changed in three years. But our “voice” insists that Bernanke is running a different, more deflationary policy than Greenspan — even though under Bernanke’s reign, since 2005-06, the broad credit aggregates have reaccelerated and the tightening campaign abandoned, and reversed.

Clearly, the Bernanke Fed is running a different policy.

But it is difficult to call it a more deflationary one:

Okay, so it has kept M1 flat, and slowed the growth in the monetary base a wee bit further (which has no doubt contributed to the crisis). And since August, the Fed has not expanded bank reserves overall, even though it has slashed its policy-setting interest rate by 300 basis points, has taken other measures to ensure short-term liquidity and talks as if it is ready to underwrite almost any insolvency.

We may point out that if the Fed wanted deflation, it would have already arrived.

If, for example, Bernanke actually did nothing, the monetary base would have probably shrunk.

At a minimum, the Fed is inflating just enough to replenish erosion in bank reserves and the market’s confidence. The thrust of all of its actions has been to cheapen money and credit and inflate.

That is not to say there aren’t any deflationary forces in the system — just not ones produced by the actions of the Federal Reserve System so far. If there is deflation in the system, stable money proves the Fed is inflating. If it were pursuing a deflationary policy, you’d have seen a few more Bear Stearns by now — and it is unlikely that the broader credit aggregates like M3 and money with zero maturity (MZM) would be expanding so furiously.

Sure, there is a run on risk, and this risk aversion is causing some asset deflation, which in turn is producing a lot of short-term liquidity. So the Fed hasn’t had to create a lot of net new notes to push rates down, yet. Consequently, so far, it is merely underwriting a lot of the market’s current confidence, rather than monetizing it. But it does not necessarily follow from stable money supplies that the Fed is deliberating a deflationary policy.

The Deflation Equation Doesn’t Add Up

So deflation has not set in yet, but our normally credible source is still convinced that Bernanke is secretly pursuing a policy of deflation while pretending to inflate. But from the central bank’s point of view, the costs of such a policy are prohibitive. So why am I still listening to this “voice”?

Because it believes the Fed wants to hijack the gold market… In other words, the Fed is trying to quell the rise in the gold price.

A central bank’s general incentive to dampen gold fever is a given, but why would it want to so bad that it would be willing to risk political suicide? Our voice explains that some of the large bullion banks still hold massive derivative short positions in gold, which they borrowed from the central banks to sell into the market in the ‘90s. We have not heard any of them report large losses on those positions yet.

They are potentially huge.

But are they huge enough to motivate the Federal Reserve to orchestrate a deflation policy in order to save these banks from ruin?

The last genuine deflation in the U.S. (1929-33) wiped out almost all the banks. Are you telling me that the gold shorts held by a few select bullion banks can cause more total pain than a deflation policy?

I doubt it, especially since the central banks are so forgiving on the terms of the gold loans.

This voice is right that the Fed is not expanding narrow money.

It is wrong about the Fed targeting deflation.

So Is the Fed Targeting Gold?

It should be. Bernanke may well be trying to keep the monetary base stable to discourage speculation in the gold and oil markets, while at the same time boosting confidence in dollar-denominated assets.

This kind of a balancing act (or “sterilized” inflation) is not foreign to the Fed’s modus operandi.

In fact, it was well accomplished by Bernanke’s predecessor.

While the idea that the Fed is deliberating deflation in order to undermine gold makes little sense, the fact that the monetary base is not growing is relevant and deserves further monitoring. Regardless of the explanation, when the central bank is not inflating, it is not bullish for gold. I say this even though, empirically, the relationship between money (i.e., M1) growth rates and gold prices is not cut and dry.

If you bought and sold gold based on the requisite changes in M1 growth rates, you’d be on the wrong side of the trade most of the time, at least since the ‘80s. You’d have turned bearish after 2004, missing the last $400 rally. It is important to monitor. But we live in a global world today. The effects of inflation produced by China’s central bank are felt in America, and vice versa.

It’s especially a bad idea to short gold. But it is a good time to pick away at values created by the “Chicken Littles” on the way up to $2,000 — if you believe that the Fed is inflating.

I’m not going to tell you that gold is going to go up whether we have deflation or more inflation. I don’t believe that. I believe gold prices would fall in a monetary deflation. But I don’t expect one soon.

Regards,
Ed Bugos
April 3, 2008

How the Fed Effects Gold was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder